What if the end of a tax detested by millions of French people did not benefit everyone in the same way? The abolition of the housing tax was long presented as a collective victory, a tax gift offered to all households. On paper, the story is beautiful: fewer charges, more purchasing power, a housing bill that finally lightens. But behind this reassuring national average lies a far more contrasting reality, revealed by the latest INSEE figures for 2024. For while the vast majority of households did indeed see their burden rate decrease, a quarter of them, the most modest, did not get this chance. Worse, their situation even worsened. A decryption of a paradox that says a lot about the persistent inequalities around housing in France.
- The average net burden rate for households for their housing rose to 16.8% of income in 2024, down from 18.3% in 2014, thanks to the abolition of the housing tax.
- For the bottom quarter of households, the burden rate increased by 1.1 percentage points over ten years, reaching 32.1% in 2024.
- This deterioration is explained by the erosion of housing subsidies, whose share in the income of modest households fell from 10% to 6.9% between 2014 and 2024.
- The end of the housing tax changed the housing bill for millions of households
- Sixteen point eight percent: the new face of the French burden rate
- The poorest quarter pays dearly as housing subsidies erode
- Renters, homeowners, single-parent families: who really wins and who loses in this game
The end of the housing tax has changed the housing bill for millions of households
We must remember what the housing tax represented before its gradual disappearance: an additional line, often heavy, on every household’s annual budget, whether owner or renter. Its abolition mechanically reduced the weight of housing in French expenses, and INSEE’s numbers confirm this clearly. In 2024, the net burden rate for households on their principal residence stands at 16.8% of income, versus 18.3% in 2014. A drop of 1.5 percentage points that, on a national scale, represents a substantial saving for millions of households.
This improvement is not anecdotal: it directly touches the wallet, at that moment of the year when people still dread, out of habit, the arrival of a local tax bill. Yet INSEE is explicit: this decrease is primarily linked to the abolition of the housing tax, and not to a general improvement in housing conditions or incomes. In other words, the state has indeed lightened the bill, but this relief rests on a precise, almost mechanical mechanism, rather than on a broad, favorable dynamic for everyone.
Sixteen point eight percent: the new face of the French burden rate
Behind this 16.8% figure there is an interesting breakdown to observe. Before subsidies, the gross burden rate reaches 17.5% of household income. That total is distributed as: 10.7% for rents or loan repayments, 3.5% for energy expenses, 1.9% for charges and water, and 1.4% for property tax. Housing subsidies then reduce this burden by an average of 0.8 percentage point, yielding the final net rate of 16.8%.
What stands out is the robustness of this structure: housing, between rent and energy, remains by far the heaviest item, well ahead of the residual local taxation. Across the population, the situation remains overall managed: more than eight out of ten households show a burden rate below 33%. But this figure hides a segment that clearly drops off: one in ten households exceeds 40%, a threshold beyond which housing becomes, in effect, the absolute budget priority of the family, at the expense of everything else.
The poorest quarter pays dearly as housing subsidies erode
This is where the picture darkens. For the lowest-income quarter of households, the trend is reversed: their net burden rate has increased by 1.1 percentage points over ten years, reaching 32.1% in 2024. While the national average was falling, this segment of the population saw its burden rise, a move that directly contributes to widening inequalities between income groups.
The reason largely lies in the progressive erosion of housing subsidies. While they reduce the burden by 0.8 point on average across all households, this protection has weakened over time, and it is precisely the most fragile households that bear the heaviest weight. The finding is clear: according to INSEE, the share of housing subsidies in the income of modest households dropped from 10% in 2014 to only 6.9% in 2024. In plain terms, the safety net that once protected these households has been trimmed by about a third in a decade, without the abolition of the housing tax being enough to compensate for this loss.
Renters, homeowners, single-parent families: who really wins and who loses in this game
The occupancy status of the dwelling plays a decisive role in this uneven distribution of efforts. Private-sector renters bear a burden rate of 25.4%, followed by social housing renters at 24.0%, then aspiring homeowners at 23.3%. Non-acceding homeowners, by contrast, fare much better at 7.4%, a figure that makes sense since they no longer have a mortgage to repay.
Over ten years, the burden rate has remained stable for social-housing tenants, while it has declined for other renters and for homeowners. One detail clarifies this apparent paradox: at equal income, private-sector renters devote more of their income to housing than social housing tenants, who largely come from the poorest quartile of the population. Social housing thus continues to play a significant role for the most fragile households, without being enough to fully erase the gaps observed.
Finally, one last takeaway deserves attention: the single people and the single-parent families display the highest burden rates of all the studied categories. This situation is logically explained by a higher share of renters among these households, combined with generally lower incomes. Living alone, or raising children without a partner, thus means carrying a housing burden proportionally much heavier than the French average.
In the end, the abolition of the housing tax remains a measure that has relieved the budgets of the vast majority of French households, and this finding should not be minimized. But it tells only part of the story. While the national average improved, the poorest quarter of households saw their housing burden rise, weakened by subsidies that gradually lose their reach. A question then deserves attention as we return to school and concerns about purchasing power remain at the forefront: can we continue to speak of successful housing policy as long as its fruits do not reach those who need them most?