On 4 April 2025, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce sent shockwaves through global supply chains with a move as precise as surgical scalpel work: it imposed export controls on seven rare earths and on magnets used in the defense, energy, and automotive sectors, in response to President Trump’s increases in tariffs on Chinese goods. Seven names that sound almost like an alchemical formula: samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium, and yttrium. These materials, mid-to-heavy rare earths, now require special export licenses to leave the Chinese territory. Behind this chemist’s vocabulary lies a geopolitical reality that should concern any Western leader.
A monopoly built over sixty years, unleashed with a snap
China mines more than 60% of the world’s rare earths, accounts for over 80% of refining, and manufactures roughly 90% of high-performance magnets. This isn’t merely a geological accident. The dominance results from six decades of planning and investment, frequently decided at the highest levels of the Chinese Communist Party and the state. As far back as the 1990s, Beijing adopted a ruthless strategy: it began selling rare earths at rock-bottom prices, forcing California mines that supplied the majority of the market to shut down in the 2000s. Competitors laid down their tools. China reaped the rewards.
The dominance is not uniform; it is absolute in certain links. China is the world’s sole producer of samarium, a rare metal used in numerous military applications. It is also the only country that fully controls the refining of ultraclean dysprosium: 100% of global supply comes from a single plant in Wuxi, near Shanghai. One plant. For the entire planet. Industry estimates put China’s share at 85% of holmium, 90% of thulium, 98% of dysprosium, and 99% of yttrium. These figures are dizzying, and not only to economists.
For years, China has progressively imposed export licenses on an increasing number of critical metals. In July 2023, the strategy began with germanium and gallium. Antimony joined the list in August 2024, followed by tungsten, molybdenum, indium, tellurium, and bismuth in early 2025. The April 2025 restrictions on the heavier rare earths were therefore not a rash reaction. They represent the culmination of a methodical strategy patiently built up.
Terbium, dysprosium: esoteric names, very concrete stakes
Dysprosium and terbium regulate the temperature tolerance of magnets essential to the operation of onshore and offshore wind turbines, electric vehicles, fighter jets, missiles, drones, and spacecraft. They enable these magnets to stay stable under extreme temperatures, where an ordinary magnet would melt or lose its properties. Without dysprosium, an electric car’s motor becomes unusable at high load. Without terbium, certain advanced sensors cease to function.
The military dimension of these restrictions is immediate. The F-35 fighters, Virginia- and Columbia-class submarines, Tomahawk missiles, radar systems, Predator drones, and Joint Direct Attack Munitions bombs cannot be manufactured without hundreds of kilograms of heavy rare earths. Each F-35 requires more than 400 kilograms of rare earths, including neodymium, samarium, dysprosium, terbium, and yttrium, which are indispensable for permanent magnets, radar, stealth coatings, and missile guidance. A $100 million fighter jet grounded because of a metal no one can name would be a stark image of the supply chain’s fragility.
The impact did not take long to be felt in civilian industries. Chinese exports of rare-earth magnets fell by roughly three-quarters in the two months following the new measures. Automakers and renewable-energy manufacturers rushed to identify alternatives. The Japanese carmaker Suzuki was forced to pause production of a Swift model, citing shortages of certain components. Ford likewise halted Explorer output for a week after stockouts at a magnet supplier. Even when trade resumed, prices for rare earths in importing regions stayed high, with European prices reaching up to six times those seen in China.
October 2025: China goes even further
The April 2025 restrictions were only an opening act. among October’s announcements was the establishment of an extraterritoriality criterion to control the export of goods that incorporate Chinese rare Earths or magnets, even if they are produced abroad. Concretely: a French manufacturer using Chinese permanent magnets in its products would, on paper, have to obtain clearance from the Chinese authorities before any export, regardless of destination or client sector. The mechanism is devastatingly effective: China asserts that it can regulate products manufactured in Germany, Japan, or France, as long as they contain even a trace of Chinese-origin material.
This standoff sparked partial de-escalation. In November 2025, China formally suspended the October measures for a year. The move was framed as part of a broader agreement between Washington and Beijing, reached after a Xi-Trump meeting, involving the rollback of various tariffs and trade barriers. Yet beware: the export controls imposed in April on the seven mid-to-heavy rare earths remained fully in force, while the October measures were placed on hold for a year pending a fresh review.
The race against the clock to break free from Beijing
The Western response moved rapidly into action. In the United States—the country that relied on China for more than 80% of its rare-earth imports—concern gave way to a coordinated industrial strategy. The Department of Defense finalized a $400 million partnership with MP Materials, the United States’ only integrated mining-and-processing operation involved in the sector.
The company RElloys (listed on Nasdaq under the ticker ALOY) illustrates the urgency of rebuilding a Western supply chain. By March 2026, it claimed to have created something nearly non-existent in the Western world: a rare-earth supply chain with no Chinese touch at any stage. In early March 2026, it also secured a Pentagon contract worth up to $1.7 million to fund the design of a facility to process metals used to manufacture magnets for defense and electronics. Sheep Creek, a Montana deposit, contains high concentrations of dysprosium and terbium used to power the high-performance permanent magnets in fighter jets, missile guidance systems, and radar platforms.
In Europe, France is not absent from the game. The Lyon-based startup Carester is installing a heavy rare-earth refinery for permanent magnets, focusing on dysprosium and terbium, at Lacq in the Pyrénées-Atlantiques region. The project is slated to begin in late 2026. This site, through its Caremag subsidiary, will also become Europe’s largest rare-earth recycling plant, aiming to recycle about 2,000 tonnes of magnets to extract 1,400 tonnes of rare earths. A “valley of magnets” is taking shape in Béarn, just a few kilometers from ski slopes.
The fundamental problem remains, succinctly stated by experts: the Western rare-earth challenge is not limited to extraction or separation, but more fundamentally lies in metallization. Producing oxides is not enough. These materials must then be converted into metals, then into alloys, before being integrated into magnets used by the defense and high-tech sectors. Until 2023, China supplied 99% of global refining of heavy rare earths, with the only refinery outside the country—the one in Vietnam—having been shut for a year due to a tax dispute, effectively granting China a total monopoly over the supply. Rebuilding this know-how takes decades. Beijing understands this, and that is precisely why its restrictions are such a potent lever. Today, China consumes about 60% of its own rare earths for domestic production, and this consumption is rising: its capacity to flood the global market as it did a decade ago is diminishing because it needs more of its own supply. A geopolitical double bind that the West has not yet found a way out of.
Sources: REalloys, a rare-earth company, falls after a $50 million equity sale following a defense contract award in the United States – 2026-03-06 14:06 (boursorama.com) | REalloys and U.S. Critical Materials sign an accord to build a national rare-earth supply chain – 2026-04-01 16:21 (boursorama.com) | The Commission must tackle China’s rare-earth export restrictions (europarl.europa.eu)
Article prepared with the help of AI · Our method